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Abstract: 
In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether 
or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In 
‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s 
understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted.  His reason is that the 
prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating 
our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of 
Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach 
to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question 
is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally 
real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, 
albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal 
entities to exist in a totum simul.  
 
1 Introduction 
Contemporary metaphysics of time is shaped by the opposition between A-theorists and B-
theorists. The B-theory, as it is commonly understood, includes three main tenets. The first is 
eternalism, which says that all times exist, and that past and future entities (like dinosaurs and 
Martian outposts) are just as real as present ones.
1
 The second is that there are no monadic 
temporal properties like pastness, presentness or futurity, but only temporal relations like 
succession and simultaneity. The third is that the fundamental temporal facts are tenseless 
facts that obtain once and for all, like the fact that my writing this occurs (tenselessly) on a 
Monday. There are, fundamentally, no tensed facts that change over time, like the fact that it 
is Monday today. According to the B-theory, a complete description of temporal reality 
                                                          
1
 None of what follows will require the further distinction between substantivalism and relationism, only the 
former of which posits times understood as entities that are independent of objects and events. But note that I’m 
assuming that if times so understood exist, they are concrete. That way ersatzist presentism, on which times are 
abstract entities, doesn’t get (mis-)classified as eternalism.  
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needn’t specify which time is now. It’s true that you’re reading now, but what makes this true 
is the fact that you (tenselessly) read at a certain time on a certain day - and that’s a fact once 
and for all. 
The B-theory is usually taken to be a theory according to which, in reality, time does 
not pass. 
A handful of philosophers have argued for diverging claims concerning the connection 
between the B-theory of time and various philosophical questions about death. Thus, Harry 
Silverstein and Ben Bradley have argued that the B-theory provides a reason for regarding 
death as an evil for the person who dies (though Bradley has since retracted the claim).
2
 By 
contrast, Robin Le Poidevin has argued for a claim that pulls in the opposite direction.
3
 In 
Arguing for Atheism (as well as in ‘Time, death and the atheist’), he suggests that a 
commitment to the B-theory can provide atheists who don’t believe in an afterlife with a 
reason not to fear death, or at least with a reason to fear it less.
4
 (From now on I’ll assume that 
atheists typically don’t believe in an afterlife.) 
Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory (by which I’ll mean his view as described 
in these publications) is rather unusual. Above I listed eternalism, the view that past and 
future times and objects exist, as the first of the B-theory’s three tenets. But in spite of the 
suggestive label, eternalism is usually taken to be a fairly innocuous doctrine, one without 
much import for how to view death. Another way to express eternalism is this. Past and future 
times and entities fall just as squarely within the range of our most unrestricted quantifiers as 
present ones do. What’s comforting about that?  
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 Silverstein 1980, 2000. Bradley 2004; Bradley 2009, p. 82, footnote 18.  
3
 Note that the claims are not directly opposed, since Silverstein’s concerns the (dis-)value of death, whereas Le 
Poidevin’s concerns reasons to fear death (though Le Poidevin is not explicit about this distinction). Note also 
that Le Poidevin’s suggestion seems broad enough to pertain not only to attitudes towards one’s own death, but 
also that of others. 
4
 Le Poidevin 1996, ch. 10. Le Poidevin 1995. 
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Another question to ask at this point is why Le Poidevin makes this claim about the B-
theory, when it seems to be just about eternalism. After all, there are eternalist A-theories, too. 
In particular, on the moving spotlight theory, all times exist, but the non-perspectival property 
of being present moves from earlier to later times.
5
 I’ll suggest a possible reason for this 
emphasis in the final section. 
In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s 
understanding of the B-theory, B-theorists have no less reason to fear death than A-theorists.
6
 
His concern is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and 
future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. In this paper, I examine his 
argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly 
spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t 
isolate the source of that tension. I then suggest that there is a way to negotiate the tension, 
though the resulting view is a strange one. It takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and 
temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.  
I begin by summarising the prevalent B-theoretic approach to our attitudes towards the 
past and the future (section 2). I then lay out Burley’s argument (section 3). Next, I evaluate 
the argument, and suggest that the real point of contention concerns the sense of ‘eternal 
existence’ Le Poidevin has in mind (section 4). Finally (section 5), I sketch the view that I 
think is suggested by Le Poidevin’s remarks, and show how it might still be combined with a 
non-revisionary approach to our attitudes towards the past and the future.  
 
2 The B-theoretic account of tensed emotions  
                                                          
5
 For recent defenses of the moving spotlight view see Skow 2012, Deasy 2014. Another example of an eternalist 
A-theory is the minimal A-theory Sullivan 2012. 
6
 Burley 2008a. 
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Recall Arthur Prior’s ‘Thank Goodness that’s over’ challenge. The challenge was 
originally directed towards the claim that all tensed sentences could be translated by means of 
tenseless sentences without loss of meaning. The challenge was this: if ‘thank goodness that’s 
over’, uttered at t, meant the same as ‘thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is at t’ or 
‘thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is simultaneous with this utterance’, then why 
would anyone say or think it?  
Nowadays, most B-theorists do not hold that tensed sentences can be so translated. 
Instead, the new B-theory merely says that tensed utterances can be given tenseless truth 
conditions, so that when they are true, they are made true by tenseless, not tensed facts. But 
clearly, a similar challenge arises for the new B-theory: what am I thanking goodness for 
when I utter at noon, ‚thank goodness that’s over‘? Not the tensed fact that the experience is 
over, i.e. past, for there is no such fact. Nor the tenseless fact that the conclusion of the 
experience is at noon – that was a fact all morning. Nor the fact that the conclusion of the 
experience is simultaneous with my utterance ‘thank goodness that’s over’ – why would 
anyone thank goodness for that? More generally, the challenge is to tell a B-theoretic story 
about the objects of emotions such as dread, joyous anticipation, relief, anxiety, nostalgia, and 
so forth. Let’s call these ‘tensed emotions’. They’re emotions directed towards the pastness, 
presentness or futurity of events. 
The prevalent B-theoretic response to Prior’s challenge (due mainly to Mellor and 
MacBeath) is as follows.
7
 Belief reports and reports of emotions generate non-extensional 
contexts. I can believe that George Orwell wrote 1984 while not believing that Eric Blair 
wrote 1984 (even though George Orwell is Eric Blair). Similarly, I can thank goodness for the 
fact that my pain is past while not thanking goodness for the fact that the conclusion of my 
pain is at noon, even though the fact that makes my belief that it’s past true is the fact that the 
                                                          
7
 Mellor 1981, 1983. MacBeath 1983. 
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conclusion is at noon. My relief is directed at what I believe to be the case, namely that the 
pain is past. This is the content of the past tensed belief, and the intentional object of my 
relief.
8
  
So B-theorists can distinguish between what a tensed emotion is directed at, and the 
underlying tenseless facts. They can also hold that even a false tensed belief can give rise to a 
warranted tensed emotion – just as long as the belief itself is warranted. If I have reason to 
believe tomorrow’s dentist visit will be painful, I have reason to dread it, even if it turns out 
that the visit will be cancelled, or will be painless. 
 
3 Burley’s argument 
Recall that Burley thinks this account implies that even on Le Poidevin’s 
understanding of the B-theory, B-theorists have no less reason to fear death than A-theorists.  
He begins by pointing out that B-theorists don’t recommend that we change our tensed 
emotional life, nor do they think tensed emotions involve a pervasive error. On the contrary, 
the account described above is intended to allow B-theorists to hold that our tensed emotions 
are intelligible, and often appropriate.  
He then considers two candidate beliefs concerning the fear of death that are 
unwarranted by B-theoretic standards, namely a hypochondriac’s unwarranted belief that 
they’ll die soon, and someone’s delusional belief that they have already died. He dismisses 
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 A further question that is often put to B-theorists in this context is this. Why are certain tensed emotions (such 
as relief, nostalgia etc.) appropriate only after events, and others (such as dread, anticipation etc.) appropriate 
only before events? But as Mellor already notes, A-theorists are in no better a position to provide an explanation 
here than B-theorists (e.g. why feel dread only towards future events?). Moreover, it’s not clear that all our 
tensed emotions are appropriate. What’s clear is that the temporal asymmetry in our attitudes is curious, and 
interesting evolutionary explanations of this and other temporal biases have been given (Dyke & Maclaurin 
2002, Suhler & Callender 2012). 
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these as not relevant to Le Poidevin’s thesis. After all, he says, the latter concerns a fear of 
annihilation, rather than of dying at some particular time, let alone of having died already.  
‘[T]he pertinent question to ask is: Is someone who disbelieves in an afterlife warranted in 
fearing death according to the Mellor-MacBeath account of the way in which our emotions 
connect with our beliefs? One might think that, in order to conform to the details of Le 
Poidevin’s proposal, we would need to add to this question the clause: ‘given that the person 
concerned accepts the B-theory’. This would be unnecessary, however, as the Mellor-
MacBeath account treats one’s metaphysical beliefs about time as irrelevant to the 
warrantedness of one’s feelings or emotional attitudes.’9  
He then lays out what he takes to be the key example: 
‘Let us, then, consider an atheist, Jo, who fears death because of a particular belief, which has 
as its propositional content the intentional fact that ‘My death will be a passage into 
oblivion’.’10 (By ‘intentional fact’ he means the content of the tensed belief in question.) 
In a footnote, he adds that the relevant belief’s content could also be expressed as ‘’After I 
die, I will no longer exist’ (provided ‘exist’ is understood in the tensed, A-theoretic sense)’. 
‘According to the B-theory, the truth condition of this belief would be the tenseless fact that 
there is no time later than Jo’s death at which Jo is located. Any B-theorist who denies the 
possibility of an afterlife should concur that this tenseless fact obtains, and hence […] that 
Jo’s belief is true.’11 
Similarly, Burley concludes, Jo’s belief is warranted, since it’s responsive to the evidence 
available to her and consistent with her other beliefs. So her fear of no longer existing after 
death is warranted, too. 
Here is Burley’s own summary of his criticism: 
‘Le Poidevin maintains that, if the B-theory is true, there is some sense in which, at times later 
than one’s death, it remains the case that one exists, even though there are no times later than 
one’s death at which one is located. In this article I have not disputed this claim. Le Poidevin 
maintains, further, that in view of this B-theoretic fact a commitment to the B-theory gives the 
atheist a reason to relinquish her fear of death, in so far as that fear of death is a fear of 
annihilation. This further claim presupposes that a metaphysical belief – specifically a B-
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 Burley 2008a, p. 269. 
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 Burley 2008a, p. 269. 
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 Burley 2008a, p. 269/70. 
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theoretic belief – is sufficient to transform an emotional attitude, specifically the fear of death. 
[…] I have argued that this presupposition is inconsistent with [the Mellor-MacBeath model] 
[…] [A]ccording to this model, A-theoretic beliefs, but not B-theoretic ones, are sufficient to 
warrant our emotional attitudes, provided those A-theoretic beliefs are themselves warranted. 
[…] [They are] warranted by ordinary (non-metaphysical, and hence non-B-theoretic) 
standards, and [are] sufficient to warrant the accompanying feelings of gladness and relief. I 
maintain that, by parity of reasoning, an atheist’s fear of death is warranted according to the 
Mellor-MacBeath model, and that a commitment to the B-theory […] would give such a 
person no reason to relinquish the fear.’12  
He concludes that if Le Poidevin’s thesis is to stand, what’s needed is either a new B-theoretic 
account of tensed emotions, or an explanation of why our fear of death is a special case. 
 
4 Burley’s argument examined 
I think Burley’s line of thought can be put as follows. On the Mellor-MacBeath model, 
the tenseless nature of reality is one step removed from our emotional life, where the link 
consists of true tensed beliefs, held at the right times. If there wasn’t this link, and we had 
only tenseless beliefs, we would never be moved to action (‘the meeting is starting now!’), 
and there wouldn’t be any pastness or presentness or futurity (not even in the form of 
‘intentional facts’) to be emotional about. How can the tenseless nature of reality be generally 
one step removed from our emotions, and yet connect up with our emotions concerning 
death?  
He’s right that there is a tension between Le Poidevin’s claim and a non-revisionary 
attitude to our tensed emotions more generally. But his argument doesn’t seem to isolate the 
source of that tension.  
Consider again Prior’s case of someone thanking goodness that an unpleasant 
experience (such as a headache) is over. On the B-theory, there is a sense in which nothing is 
ever over, because nothing is ever past. But B-theorists want to be able to hold that the 
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subject’s relief is warranted. So they hold that the subject is thanking goodness for what is 
believed to be the case, namely that it’s over. The relief is warranted, because the belief is 
warranted. Now consider our fear of post-mortem non-existence. Suppose that on the B-
theory, nothing ever really goes out of existence. Burley thinks the same considerations apply 
here: the subject’s fear is warranted because the belief is warranted. The subject is dreading 
what is believed to be the case, namely that they will cease to exist.  
But is the belief that they will cease to exist warranted? In the former case, the reason 
the tensed belief is warranted (and true) is that the tenseless facts and the evidence concerning 
them are right. That is, the conclusion of the headache does precede the utterance, and the 
subject has evidence for this. But now assume that in the latter case, the subject tenselessly 
exists outside of their life span, and has evidence for this from her metaphysics class. Then 
the belief isn’t either warranted or true. 
The reason Burley disagrees is contained in his footnote on how to understand Jo’s 
belief that she will cease to exist. He thinks ‘exists’ should here be understood ‘in its tensed, 
A-theoretic sense’. This connects up with his later remark that it’s ‘A-theoretic beliefs, but not 
B-theoretic ones, that are sufficient to warrant our emotional attitudes’, according to the 
Mellor-MacBeath model.  
Jo’s belief that she will cease to exist is an A-theoretic one in the sense that it’s a 
(future) tensed belief. But in what sense should ‘exist’ be understood as tensed, or A-
theoretic? Consider ordinary, non-philosophical talk of one’s future existence or non-
existence. It’s reasonable to think that such talk doesn’t latch onto the unrestricted sense of 
‘existence’ that is in play in eternalism as usually understood. If someone in a non-
philosophical context says ‘after my death, I will cease to exist’, normal B-theorists will take 
 
 
9 
that to be true, since the region in which she’s spatiotemporally located doesn’t include any 
region after her death. Insofar as her evidence indicates this, her belief will be warranted.  
However, what’s at issue here is the emotional life of a B-theorist, and in particular, of 
a B-theorist who shares Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory. Now, in many contexts, 
it may still be reasonable to interpret their belief about future non-existence as being about a 
lack of spatiotemporal location. But surely it wouldn’t be reasonable to insist on interpreting it 
thus in all contexts. And presumably, what’s relevant is the context in which the belief ‘I will 
cease to exist’ expresses the (unwarranted) conviction that one will not partake of that ersatz 
immortality that (one thinks) the fabric of space-time guarantees one. Indeed, in the main text, 
that seems to be the belief Burley explicitly considers: ‘my death will be a passage into 
oblivion’, where ‘passage into oblivion’ is Le Poidevin’s phrase for what death would be if 
eternalism (as understood by him) was false.  
Recall that when considering the case of atheist Jo, Burley deliberately disregards 
whether she’s a B-theorist. So Burley might object that Jo’s metaphysical views about time, 
and Jo’s evidence for her views, are irrelevant to the epistemic status of her belief that she 
will cease to exist. But why think that? After all, on the interpretation of eternalism we are 
assuming, whether or not Jo will cease to exist depends partly on the metaphysical truth about 
time. That’s what is unique about our fear of death. The “[prevalent B-theoretic account] 
treats one’s metaphysical beliefs about time as being irrelevant to the warrantedness of one’s 
feelings or emotional attitudes”, only if those metaphysical beliefs are not relevant to the 
tensed beliefs the emotions are based on, i.e. only if they don’t concern the same subject 
matter. In this case, they do. 
However, as indicated, I think Burley’s overall point (that there is a tension with the 
non-revisionary approach to tensed emotions) is right. Indeed, he may not mean to grant that 
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there could be an interesting sense of continued existence on the B-theory (‘I will grant Le 
Poidevin […] that […] there is some sense in which the person’s life never goes out of 
existence’)13. The real point of contention concerns Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-
theory. What I’ve said so far depends on a construal of Le Poidevin’s thesis that is hard to 
sustain on closer inspection. 
This construal effectively says that the tenseless facts of the case are not what they 
ordinarily seem. Even at times outside of one’s life span, one (tenselessly) exists in some 
sense. Le Poidevin’s remarks suggest that he thinks of both one’s life and of oneself as 
‘eternally real’. If these were the tenseless facts, the relevant tensed belief (‘I will cease to 
exist’) would in the right context indeed be unwarranted. The question is, how are we to think 
of the shadowy (tenselesss) existence at times outside one’s life span? And what would it 
even be for one’s life to be real (before and) after one’s life?  
On the one hand, too flimsy a sense of future existence presumably won’t be 
comforting, and hence not relevant to the topic. On the other hand, too robust a sense will 
threaten to obliterate the particular tenseless facts a common sense B-theorist starts out with. 
Barring survival as an immortal soul, what could this kind of ersatz immortality amount to? 
Are we to claim that everyone is alive at all times, and that every process goes on forever? 
Apart from the obvious implausibility of this idea, we would then face the problem that 
headaches, too, would seem to go on forever. So Burley’s overall point would still stand: we 
couldn’t ever feel warranted emotions concerning the pastness or futurity of events, because 
no events ever would be (entirely) past or future – not because fundamentally, there’d be no 
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 Burley 2008a, p. 262. Burley may agree, since in another publication he discusses this point (Burley 2008b). 
There, he distinguishes between alethic and ontic eternalism. The latter is the obviously implausible view I 
discuss in the next paragraph, which he too dismisses. The former is the view that there are eternal truths (e.g. 
that one existed), which he rightly says is not exclusive to the B-theory. He also discusses the prospects of a 
potential third view, factual eternalism, which he takes to collapse into ontic eternalism : there are eternal facts 
(about one’s life). I agree that this by itself doesn’t constitue a genuine alternative; however, in the next section I 
sketch what I take to be a genuinely distinct, albeit elusive, view in the vicinity. 
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tensed facts (though there wouldn’t), but because the fundamental tenseless facts would 
falsify all tensed beliefs except those of the form ‘event e is present’ (for all actual events).  
Is Le Poidevin’s view a non-starter then? In the final section, I want to sketch an 
interpretation of it that would accommodate the underlying intuition that there is a sense of 
eternal existence relevant to the fear of death.  
 
5 An interpretation of Le Poidevin’s B-theory 
The B-theory is often characterised as a view that treats time as on a par with space. 
The eternalist tenet says that just like all spatial locations exist, so do all temporal ones 
(including their contents). The rejection of properties like presentness or pastness is mirrored 
by a rejection of properties like being here or being over there. And the rejection of 
fundamental tensed facts has its correlate in the position that fundamentally, there are no 
spatially perspectival facts like ‘this is the UK’. The basic idea is that times, like spatial 
locations, are to be treated as equal in one’s metaphysics – none of them is in any way 
privileged, and which ones are past or future is a matter of temporal perspective.  
So it’s not surprising to find spatial metaphors being used in this context. Arguably, 
the locution ‘temporal location’ itself has spatial connotations, and eternalism is sometimes 
informally described as the view that times are ‘out there’. For most B-theorists, this is a 
useful analogy – but no more. Times aren’t really ‘out there’, i.e. themselves in some kind of 
space. It’s not that all of time exists at once, in a totum simul. It’s that it all exists, simpliciter. 
Now suppose we subtract these last cautionary remarks from the B-theoretic story. 
One way to make sense of Le Poidevin’s remarks, I think, is to think of time as quasi-spatial, 
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and of times as existing ‘at once’. So presumably there’d also be a second temporal* realm, in 
which our quasi-spatial temporal dimension and its contents would be present*.  
Consider for a moment the moving spotlight view, an eternalist A-theory. On this 
view, the past, present and future exist equally, but they become present (and then more and 
more past) successively. The usual explication of what this process makes use of primitive 
tense operators: it will be the case that the objective present is located at a later time (than t, 
the time it’s at). The moving spotlighter may then also mention the metaphor of super-time as 
a fictional aid to the understanding (e.g. Skow 2012). On one version of the view, the idea is 
that the italicised tensed fact above is to be understood as the claim that relative to some Later 
super-time (than T, which represents how things are), the objective present is at a later time. 
The view can be interpreted as involving an A-theoretically persisting B-theoretic time 
dimension (Pooley 2013): all times exist now, they have existed, and they will exist. What 
changes, first and foremost, is which of them is objectively present. As Pooley says, 
‘eternalism’ is an apt label for this view. 
How does this compare to the view I’m attributing to Poidevin?  Unlike super-time, 
which according to the moving spotlighter is merely a fiction, the second temporal* realm 
would be real.  And unlike the moving spotlight view, Le Poidevin’s doesn’t involve an 
objective present, tensed facts, or temporal passage – at least not in ordinary time. In fact, it 
probably doesn’t involve any of these things in the second temporal* realm either. It’s not that 
there is a second temporal dimension that is A-theoretic, and in which time* passes, even if 
time doesn’t pass in ours. Rather, the distinction between past*, present*, and future* is 
obliterated. Since all of our time is nonetheless thought of as present*, this in turn suggests 
that the second temporal* realm consists not of an extended dimension like ours, but of a 
single time* point (an ‘eternal present*’).  
 
 
13 
This is an elusive view. Perhaps the most serious problem is that it’s not clear exactly 
how to think of the second temporal* ‘realm’, or why it deserves to be called ‘temporal*’. A 
related problem is that it’s not clear how the two realms relate, or how the view avoids 
tensed* facts. Recall the obviously crazy view rejected in the last section. How does this view 
fare better? If I say that Socrates doesn’t exist now, what ensures the truth of my claim? 
Ordinarily it’s the tenseless fact about his existence at certain times BC and the temporal 
location of my utterance. But now there seems to be a rival fact threatening to make the claim 
false instead, namely that he (like all actual entities) exists now*.  
However, the view now under consideration doesn’t posit obviously implausible 
tenseless facts, i.e. an ordinary temporal dimension with crazy content. Instead, it adds an 
elusive second temporal* realm to an ordinary temporal dimension with reasonable content. 
What keeps our ordinary tensed talk true (when it is) is that it concerns time, rather than 
time*. 
Suppose one buys all this; is it comforting? And even if it is, doesn’t Burley’s point 
then re-appear, because for the same reason, past headaches are still troubling? Let’s take 
these in order. I do think such a view could be comforting to someone who believed it 
(leaving aside now whether anyone should believe it). We’re not as bothered about spatial 
distance as about temporal distance. Knowing that someone is out there, at this time, is 
comforting in a way that it isn’t to think of them as existing here, at some time. So thinking of 
time as more than analogous to space, as quasi-spatial, could allow one to be glad about 
someone’s past but present* existence. And the same goes for one’s own future non-
existence.  
Burley’s point now threatens to re-appear, but it’s no longer decisive. There is room 
for a sentiment pulling in the opposite direction of one’s fear of death, where there isn’t room 
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for the analogous sentiment in areas not concerning mortality. Why care if a past headache 
‘continues’ to exist in a second temporal* realm? By contrast, I might well care if such 
existence ‘awaits’ myself and others after death. I’m putting ‘awaits’ in quotation marks 
because like ‘continues’ it clearly has temporal connotations, and as far as (ordinary) temporal 
reality is concerned, all that awaits is non-existence. So the attenuating positive sentiment in 
question isn’t itself a tensed emotion. Rather, it’s gladness that we’re all (‘already’, or at least 
also) part of a realm that transcends temporality, and that that state of affairs obtains 
independently of when one exists in time (and whether that existence lies in the relative past 
of this discussion).  Of course all this can’t remove a fear of non-existence, much less sadness 
over other people’s. But perhaps, for some, it can help attenuate or transform those emotions. 
 In my interpretation of Le Poidevin, I’ve emphasized B-theoretic elements. I think one 
reason he makes his remarks about the B-theory, rather than about eternalism in general, is 
that he, like many B-theorists, takes the passing of time to be an experiential illusion. Indeed, 
he thinks that even change and motion are to a large extent projected by the mind. On the 
resulting view, the world is strikingly different from how it appears to us. In particular, it’s 
rather less changeable, and less dynamic. (Incidentally, it’s not clear to me that B-theorists 
should claim any of this (for contrary views, see e.g. Savitt 2002, Oaklander 2012, Leininger 
2013, Deng 2013, Mozersky 2015, Frischhut 2013, Hoerl 2014). But many B-theorists do, 
and that version of the B-theory is widely endorsed.
14
) And while that version of the B-theory 
isn’t as elusive as the view I’ve sketched, the two do have certain similarities. They share the 
idea that time doesn’t pass, and that in some sense, there is an unchanging reality below the 
surface of ordinary temporal experience. These similarities seem reflected in the following 
remark Einstein made shortly after the death of his friend Michele Besso: ‘Now he has also 
gone ahead of me a little in departing from this peculiar world. This means nothing. For us 
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 See (Prosser 2012) and (Paul 2010) for more B-theoretic explanations of an illusory experience of time as 
passing. 
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believing physicists, the division between past, present and future has only the significance of 
a stubbornly persistent illusion.’15 (Of course, given what I’ve been arguing, I take this to be 
about a deeper level of reality that doesn’t impugn tensed beliefs about tomorrow’s weather.) 
I suspect it’s this feature of the B-theory (as usually understood) that leads Le 
Poidevin to suggest that a metaphysical view of time has the potential to function as 
something like a religion.
16
 To the mind of a contemporary metaphysician, that’s an alien 
thought. But it’s not implausible that one of the comforts of theism, for those who do find it 
comforting, is that it offers an ‘antidote to our dismay at the transience of all natural things… 
Everything that we see passes away, but God is eternal and unchanging’.17 Even on a less 
traditional conception of God’s relation to time, one of theism’s comforts may derive from its 
positing an entity that is a lot less changeable than other things. For example, even if a theist 
thinks God is in time and subject to change, they’ll typically also think neither his/her love 
nor his/her existence are, or even could be, subject to change.  
Admittedly, it’s not clear how much work is done here by the lack of change; whether an 
unchanging reality underlying the appearances is comforting rather depends on the nature of 
that reality (imagine a permanently vengeful omnipotent deity). But perhaps the reality 
posited by the view I’ve sketched would qualify, in spite of the mixed contents of our 
temporal dimension (including not only headaches but real horrors). If so, then on that view, 
atheists  
                                                          
15
 ‘Nun ist er mir auch mit dem Abschied von dieser sonderbaren Welt ein wenig vorausgegangen. Dies bedeutet 
nichts. Für uns gläubige Physiker hat die Scheidung zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nur die 
Bedeutung einer wenn auch hartnäckigen Illusion.’  (Einstein 1972, p. 538; my translation) 
16
 Le Poidevin 1996, p. 146. 
17
 Le Poidevin 1996, p. 135. 
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 “need not be dismayed by the apparent transience of everything [they] value, for if the 
passage of time is an illusion, such things are eternally real. And death is no longer the 
passage into oblivion: it is simply one of the temporal limits of our lives.”18 19 
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